Accountability electoral: ¿elecciones como mecanismo de rendición de cuentas?

  1. Mora Molina, Juan Jesús
Revista:
Sistema: revista de ciencias sociales

ISSN: 0210-0223

Ano de publicación: 2012

Número: 228

Páxinas: 97-118

Tipo: Artigo

Outras publicacións en: Sistema: revista de ciencias sociales

Obxectivos de Desenvolvemento Sustentable

Resumo

There is no real democracy without accountability and a true right to information. The English word �accountability� refers the need to make incumbents and officers accountable for decisions taken or avoided. That is, the electorate has to be empowered to evaluate, positively or negatively, actions of the Governments. They need transparency in office in order to see how public policies are put into effect, whether incumbents keep their promises, and take note of public opinion. Any person who takes public office always must be accountable. Consequently, accountability has to be rooted in the Rule of Law. However, since there is more than one view, a one dimensional approach is not possible. Electoral accountability is only one way, but is it the most meaningful and suitable one? Moreover, democracy demands an efficient, well-organized and crystal-clear Rule of Law, where nobody can invoke Jean Bodin�s ex legibus solutes principle as a privilege. The violation of that rule, legally or de facto, will bring exemptions and hiding of responsibility, and bredd corruption.

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